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Abstract In this paper, we present and defend the theoretical framework of an empirical
model to describe people’s fundamental moral attitudes (FMAs) to animals, the stratifi-
cation of FMAs in society and the role of FMAs in judgment on the culling of healthy
animals in an animal disease epidemic. We used philosophical animal ethics theories to
understand the moral basis of FMA convictions. Moreover, these theories provide us with a
moral language for communication between animal ethics, FMAs, and public debates. We
defend that FMA is a two-layered concept. The first layer consists of deeply felt convic-
tions about animals. The second layer consists of convictions derived from the first layer to
serve as arguments in a debate on animal issues. In a debate, the latter convictions are
variable, depending on the animal issue in a specific context, time, and place. This vari-
ability facilitates finding common ground in an animal issue between actors with opposing
convictions.
Keywords Animal disease epidemics  Philosophical animal ethics 
Fundamental moral attitudes to animals  Value of an animal’s life 
Judgment on animal issues
Introduction
From 1997 to 2003 three major animal disease epidemics: classical swine fever, foot and
mouth disease, and avian influenza swept over Europe, leaving behind millions of infected
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and healthy animals culled and numerous animal keepers traumatized. What had hap-
pened? In the early 1990s the European Union adopted a non-vaccination strategy to
control these highly contagious diseases. Stamping-out a disease, which means culling
infected and healthy animals within a radius of 1–3 km from the source of the infection,
was from a financial-economic perspective, preferable to vaccination (Mepham 2004;
Woods 2004; Koninklijke Nederlandse Academie van Wetenschappen 2002). It stopped
the disease infecting other animals, and enabled the member states to quickly regain their
‘‘disease free’’ status. The latter was imperative to resume international trade in animals
and animal products. The rationale behind the stamping-out policy was a weighing of
economic pros and cons. The financial setback for the individual animal keepers was
outweighed by the benefit to the trade position of a country as a whole. Furthermore, avian
influenza presented an additional zoonotic risk, which means that the virus can cause eye
infections in people who had been in close contact with infected animals. Some avian
influenza strains can even be lethal to people, and indeed people had died from the disease,
with one casualty in the Netherlands.
In the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the stamping-out strategy was the cause of
trauma and major public resistance (United Kingdom: Anthony 2004; Murphy-Lawless
2004; Mepham 2001, 2004; Crispin et al. 2002; Laurence 2002; Farm Animal Welfare
Council 2002; Cumbria Foot and Mouth Disease Inquiry Panel 2002; Institute for Health
Research 2002; Cohen et al. 2007; The Netherlands: Huirne et al. 2002; Haaften et al.
2002; Raad voor het Landelijk Gebied and Raad voor Dierenaangelegenheden 2003, 2004;
Nederlandse Vereniging tot Bescherming van Dieren 2004; van der Berg 2002). This
resistance not only came from the animal keepers, but also from the general public that had
been confronted with footage of burning pyres (in the United Kingdom), animal welfare
problems, and the frustration and anger of those directly involved. The resistance was
based on a number of issues. The focus of our study is on those issues that touch on
people’s basic moral convictions about animals, therefore we will only give an account of
the issues relevant for the study.
In the process a great number of animals were culled, mostly healthy animals, and
animals that were kept for non-commercial reasons. The scale and the visibility of the
culling increased the feelings of unrest, which were based on the notion that the lives of
these animals should be respected and should not be sacrificed for economic purposes. The
culling and destruction of production animals was severely criticized because the natural
course of life of a production animal, i.e., to produce food for the nation, was thwarted
(Stafleu et al. 2004). The movement restrictions, transport, and the culling were the cause
of a range of animal welfare problems (Crispin et al. 2002; Laurence 2002; van der Berg
2002; Nederlandse Vereniging tot Bescherming van Dieren 2004; Van Velzen and Dekker
2003; van der Berg 2002). Animal keepers could no longer give adequate care to their
animals, animals that were not fit for transport (e.g., pregnant animals) were still trans-
ported to slaughterhouses, and the slaughter-men were not equipped to deal with so many
animals to be culled within a very short time in conditions that were far from ideal. Many
livestock farmers were struck hard: not only because their animals were the financial basis
of their business, but also because they were powerless to care for their animals properly
and to stop the culling of animals they had sometimes bred with for many generations.
Non-commercial animal keepers argued that the control strategy was not applicable to
backyard animals, special or rare breeds, or zoo animals. These animals were not kept for
commercial reasons and were usually not exported or kept for food. Furthermore, the
relationship with these animals was to a large extent personal and not professional (Cohen
et al. 2007).
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The scale of the public outcry showed that stamping-out for economic reasons was no
longer compatible with society’s moral convictions about the right treatment of animals
(Noordhuizen-Stassen et al. 2003). Anthony (2004) concluded that competing value
frameworks were at work. This meant that economic considerations were given undue
emphasis over other values of a moral kind, such as welfare issues. We found that the
debate concentrated on three moral values: the intrinsic and relational value of an animal’s
life, the duty to treat animals well (to care for their health and well-being and to protect
them against harm), and the autonomy of the animal keepers. It became clear that these
values were not the priority values of the authorities. First, to the authorities, the value of
an animal’s life was interpreted as its economic value (to a farmer, the livestock sector, or
the country). The interests at stake were basically economic, therefore the loss of a number
of animals compared to the benefits for the sector and the country as a whole, was justified
in an economic sense (Mepham 2001). To the opponents, the value of an animal’s life
meant the value of the animal in its own right as a living being and the value of the
personal and emotional relationship between people and their animals. The morally laden
terms ‘‘right to life’’ or ‘‘respect for life’’ were used to express this opposition.
Second, an important issue was the ‘‘duty to treat animals well’’ (Crispin et al. 2002),
which for the animal keepers was the core responsibility to their animals. This was in their
view a moral duty: people deliberately choose to keep and confine animals, and therefore
are responsible for their health and well-being. In their view they were forced to act against
this moral duty, because economic duties to the nation prevailed.
Third, ‘‘autonomy’’ to the individual keeper or animal practice, meant to be at liberty to
act according to one’s own convictions to properly care for and protect their animals as
they see fit. To the authorities this was a value that could be outweighed by national
interests (Meijboom et al. in press). This justified the decision to take control of the private
domain of the animal keepers, rendering them powerless to stop the slaughter-men entering
their premises and harming and culling their animals. At a different level, animal keepers
had been denied the choice to vaccinate their animals to protect them against these
diseases.
This resistance was not about values per se (that people have a duty to treat animals well
was not contested as such), but about the choice and relative weight of values in this
specific context. People felt that these values had been overruled by a government that did
not acknowledge the fact that other values were at stake. Rather, the resistance revealed
that the government had left a number of issues out of the equation as not relevant. First, it
had not taken into account the diversity of animal practices with a diversity of human-
animal relationships specific to these practices. The rural area is no longer dominated by
livestock farmers, but now includes other animal practices, such as backyard animal
keepers, animals in nature reserves, recreation with animals (such as horseback riding), and
care farms. In these practices, the human-animal bond is personal as well as instrumental.
Second, the policy had failed to do justice to the dynamics of people’s moral convictions
about animals. The government had based its policy on (economic) values that were no
longer sufficient justification for the culling of millions of animals (Noordhuizen-Stassen
et al. 2003).
The opposition had transcended the interests of those directly involved and had become
a general issue in society as a whole, because it had touched upon very basic convictions
about animals. In a pluralistic society like the Netherlands, many convictions may exist
about animals. Despite that, there are convictions that are shared by most. What was at
stake here? Had a shift in moral convictions taken place in different animal practices and
was this the cause of the conflict? The resistance made clear that the duty to treat animals
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well is still the core value in our shared morality and that it is no longer easily outweighed
by financial-economic reasons. It also showed that the value of an animal’s life as an
intrinsic quality is gaining ground over its instrumental (economic) value. However, the
source of the conflict lay in the interpretation and the strength of these values in this
specific context. Subsequently, there was a difference in opinion on the ‘‘right’’ action to
face the epidemics.
Animal conflicts such as these bring opposing convictions to the fore, which are then
discussed in the public sphere. In this way, morality and practice keep each other in a
dynamic equilibrium. When an animal issue jeopardizes this equilibrium, a government
has an important duty to initiate a public debate on the issue. In this debate the moral
problem should first be identified. Then a critical discussion is required to find if shared
convictions are still capable of dealing with the issue, or if new morality needs to be
developed. The development of new morality in this sense means that changing moral
convictions should be reflected in new policy. If a government fails to do so, people will
start acting according to their own individual convictions and will no longer abide by
general rules, because the latter no longer reflect what they feel to be just. (The Nether-
lands saw an example of this type of civil disobedience during the avian influenza
epidemic, when many backyard animal keepers kept their animals hidden from the
slaughter-men.) To understand the driving forces of the debate the government should
understand more about the stratification of convictions in a pluralistic society.
Our convictions about animals are deeply rooted in our total belief system, and include
everything that is important to us: ourselves, other people, animals, and the natural world.
Often our ties with our fellow human beings are stronger than those with animals (Posner
2004), which means that we may lend more weight to our obligations to other people than
to animals. Also, our ties with animals we have a personal relationship with and which are
visibly present in our community (e.g., in contrast with laboratory animals), are likely to be
given more weight as individuals, animal friends, or co-citizens. This implies that (most of)
our attitudes to animals are ambiguous, because they do not apply to all animals all the
time, and in this friction, the values of animal welfare and life are variable. Yet all together
this is not new as in society we make these decisions all the time. The question is what the
influence of convictions is on these decisions and how to unify these convictions in the
‘‘right’’ policy. Although moral convictions in themselves are deeply felt, as such they are
not a matured framework of morality. Rather, they are a theoretical point of departure.
Theoretic convictions develop and become practical when used in a real life situation.
They are brought to life, shaped, reshaped, re-valued, or solidified in a public debate on a
moral issue in a specific circumstance and context. Then, the conviction once again
becomes embedded in the moral history of an individual or that of a society. What does this
mean? It means that a conviction can exists in a theoretical form and in a practical form,
and is best described by the dynamic interaction between the two. The implication is that
we should attempt to learn more about people’s theoretical convictions, because they do
exist in some form and need to be understood, including their stratification in society.
However, for a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of convictions, we also need
to learn about their role in a practical animal issue.
We aim to contribute to the public debate by presenting a model to identify fundamental
moral attitudes (FMA) about animals, to find if there is a stratification of FMAs and to
study their role in judgment on animal issues. The model is useful for structuring the
debate, and offers a moral vocabulary for understanding and communicating the moral
issues at stake.
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In the form of a questionnaire the model was used in a number of surveys performed in
the Netherlands in 2007 and 2008, among members of the general public, veterinarians,
and livestock keepers.
Methodology
We use the term ‘‘fundamental moral attitude’’ (FMA) with reference to people’s moral
convictions about animals. We chose the word fundamental to indicate that it concerns the
most basic frame of reference. It is moral because it tells us something about the right or
the wrong way to treat animals, whose welfare and flourishing can be promoted or harmed
by our actions. The word attitude to animals is already used in studies to describe people’s
views on animals and their treatment (Knight and Barnett 2008; Matthews and Herzog
1997; Serpell 2004) and therefore it makes sense to use a term that is already in use. We
defined fundamental moral attitude as the fundamental convictions of a person, or a group
of people, on the hierarchical position of animals, their value, doing good (to care for and
protect), and their rights.
In preliminary studies we obtained more insight into the key issues of the public debate
and the values that were at stake, as well as into the more fundamental academic dis-
cussions on the moral importance of animals. We drew from four sources. First, in a survey
among stakeholders in 25 member states of the European Union (Cohen et al. 2007), we
identified the priorities in future prevention and control strategies. Second, we analyzed the
key issues in the public debate about the epidemics in the Netherlands and the UK (for the
UK: Anderson 2002; Anthony 2004; Crispin et al. 2002; Cumbria foot and mouth disease
Inquiry Panel Institute for Health Research 2002; Farm Animal Welfare Council 2002;
Laurence 2002; Mepham 2001, 2004; Murphy-Lawless 2004, for the Netherlands: van der
Berg 2002; Haaften et al. 2002; Huirne et al. 2002; Raad voor het Landelijk Gebied and
Raad voor Dierenaangelegenheden 2003, 2004; Noordhuizen-Stassen et al. 2003; Van
Velzen and Dekker 2003; Cohen et al. 2007). Third, we turned to philosophical animal
ethics theories concerning the moral importance of animals. This will be discussed in more
detail further on in this section. Fourth, we performed a pilot study in 2006 among 214
non-commercial keepers of backyard animals in the Netherlands and interviewed 24
representatives of this practice. This gave us more insight into the moral vocabulary used
by these animal keepers to express their attitudes to animals in general, and the moral
dilemmas they had faced during the animal disease epidemics. With the data from this
preliminary study we developed the theoretical framework of the model.
The Theoretical Framework of the Model
We identified four elements as being relevant in people’s attitude to animals in general,
namely: hierarchy, value, doing good, and rights. These are the four ‘‘pillars’’ of FMA.
Each element consists of a number of dimensions (= the moral conviction), which reflect
an opinion on the element. Each dimension is supported by a number of arguments (= the
why of a conviction, the ‘‘building block’’ of convictions). FMA is identified and described
by the choice of dimensions and by the arguments in support of the dimensions. We will
discuss this construction in more detail.
Element one, hierarchy, is about the hierarchical position of humans with respect to
animals. This element has three dimensions: humans are superior to other animals, humans
and animals are equal, and animals are superior to humans. In Western societies, the
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hierarchical position of animals seems to be changing. The general view has been that
humans are superior to animals. This was justified from a religious, cultural, or evolu-
tionary point of view. Although Christian-Judean religious texts are open to different
interpretations, the most common interpretation was that humans rule over animals because
animals were not considered to have immortal souls, and because humans were given
stewardship over the natural world. The cultural justification is based on the fact that
animals have been domesticated and dominated for centuries, and in this historical rela-
tionship humans were superior because we use animals for our purposes, and because we
have the power to do so (Serpell 2004). The evolutionary justification holds that in the
course of evolution, humans have become more developed than other animals, especially
in mental capacities, granting them a position on top of the evolutionary ladder (Hyers
2006). The moral justification for a superior position for humans is based on criteria that
differentiate between species, for instance rationality, consciousness, or moral agency.
Nowadays, there are more people who consider humans and animals to be equal. An
equality view is based on criteria that emphasize the similarity between humans and
animals, such as both being living beings, or both being part of a natural order. The latter
view is inspired by recent scientific studies about the nature of animals and their mental
capacities (Bekoff 2007) that reveal that humans and animals share many characteristics.
In a holistic view on the natural world, animals are sometimes seen as people’s superior
teachers to reconnect with nature and our inner selves (De Cock Buning et al. 2005).
Element two refers to the value of animals. Element two consists of two dimensions:
animals have value, and animals have no value. For our purposes, value is defined as the
appreciation for an animal based on its intrinsic value, its instrumental value to people, its
relational value to people, and its functional value for the ecosystem. Over the centuries,
animals have already earned appreciation for their usefulness to people (e.g., for food) or in
a relational sense. Now animals are increasingly appreciated for their role in the ecosystem,
or as intrinsically valuable. The latter means that animals are recognized as having value in
their own right as beings with a life of their own, and a purpose in life that is inherent to
their species-specific needs.
Element three refers to doing good to animals by caring for their health and well-being,
by not harming, and by protecting them against harm. This element consists of three
dimensions: the obligation to do good to all animals, the obligation to do good to some
animals, and no obligation to do good to animals. This element reflects that people’s
actions matter to animals, whose welfare and flourishing can be promoted or thwarted by
these actions. Animals that can feel pain and emotions have a conscious desire not to be
harmed. This animal welfare issue is and has always been the core element in criticism on
certain animal use (Bentham 1789; Singer 1995). However, not all animal species can feel,
and are therefore indifferent to an action. Yet still certain actions can thwart the natural
course of their lives (Taylor 1986). Therefore, actions, though not necessarily consciously
experienced, can still be harmful to an animal.
Element four refers to animal rights, and for our study the focus is on the right to life.
Element four consists of three dimensions: all animals have a right to life, some animals
have a right to life, and animals have no right to life. The meaning of having rights is that
animals are not means to human ends, and should be able to lead their own life, undis-
turbed by people. Furthermore, having rights means that their interests to live, to flourish,
and to be free from suffering do count and should be given due consideration. The issue of
animal rights is more debated than animal welfare issues because it takes people’s legal
and moral responsibility much further (Wise 2004). Some argue that animals lack the
relevant features to qualify as rights-bearers, i.e., rational moral agents with a sense of
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justice and an understanding of, and ability to abide by mutual agreements (Carruthers
1992; Scruton 2000). Others are concerned about the practical implications of giving
animals (legal) rights (Posner 2004). Having rights could lead to substantial changes in
moral convictions and legislation, on what is considered justified in the use of animals.
This element allows for several aspects of rights. For our purpose we chose the right to life,
as this is relevant for the debate on the culling of animals in the control of the epidemics.
With respect to a right to life, there are differing points of view. According to some (Taylor
1986; Schweitzer in Warren 1997) life as such has value; therefore killing is a harm done to
all living creatures, even if the animal may not be aware of this and merely has an
unconscious urge to live. To some, only the killing of an animal with a higher intelligence
and consciousness is morally wrong, because these animals may have a concept of life,
death, and the future. They therefore have a conscious desire to live to fulfill future-
oriented desires (Regan 1983; McMahan 2002).
In general, studies on animal issues give information about people’s opinions (= the
dimensions), but usually not about the moral basis of these opinions: the moral ‘‘why’’‘of
an opinion (Serpell 2004; Herzog and Dorr 2000; Franklin 2007; Eurobarometer 2007).
Knight et al. 2003, and Knight and Barnett 2008) found that the degree of mental abilities
of animals were one determinant in people’s attitude to animals. The more mentally
developed and sentient an animal species is the least acceptable is its use for human
purposes. Those studies provide a first insight into the fundaments of people’s convictions,
but we aim to get a more comprehensive understanding of FMAs and the ‘‘why’’ question.
FMA is a moral concept, because the objects of our concern are animals that matter
morally. FMA then rests on morally relevant criteria for whether an animal needs to matter
morally, which shape our convictions. These criteria should give information about the
‘‘why’’ of convictions in a moral sense: they are the moral ‘‘building blocks’’ of FMAs. To
address this, we turned to philosophical animal ethics, because this field is all about criteria
for why animals are (or are not) morally important and how these guide our ensuing duties
to them (Warren 1997). Religion is another source of moral convictions. This we discuss
briefly in the discussion. We chose to restrict ourselves to animal ethics, because religion is
not about animals per se, but about the place of humans and animals in creation. We
selected criteria that were relevant for our model and divided them into four categories;
intrinsic, relational, functional/instrumental, and virtue. Some examples may clarify this.
Someone may think that humans are superior to animals (why?), because animals lack
rationality (intrinsic). Someone may value animals (why?), because they have an instru-
mental value (functional) or emotional (relational) value to people. We should be kind to
animals (why?), because this makes us better people (virtue). Animals have rights (why?)
because they are living beings with their species-specific goal in life (intrinsic). The model
gives insight into these building blocks of FMA. We will briefly discuss these criteria.
In a number of theories, one intrinsic criterion or more than one, define the moral
importance of an animal. For some theorists, the fact that an animal is a living being is
sufficient reason to grant it (certain) moral importance. Albert Schweitzer (Schweitzer in
Warren 1997) described his thoughts in his Reverence for Life theory. He stated that the
possession of organic life is sufficient for full and equal concern. In his view, all living
organisms are capable of experiencing positive or negative sensations. Taylor (1986) does
not take this capacity to feel as the basis for concern. In his theory of Respect for Nature,
he states that every living being that is goal-oriented and has a good-of-its-own should be
subject to our concern. Animals are goal-oriented when they are directed to fulfill their life-
cycle through growth, reproduction, and adaptation to their environment. A being has a
good-of-its-own when it has needs. Therefore, it is possible to speak of actions that are
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beneficial to the well-being of this being, or are harmful to it. This concept does not require
the being to realize or to care whether something is beneficial or harmful to its good. It
does not need to have a conscious interest in the action. It suffices that the action is in the
interest of the being.
All living beings possess life, but only species with a more complex neurological
system are considered to be sentient. Sentience means the capacity to feel pain and
emotions. Many theories (e.g., Bentham 1789; Singer 1995) are based on the concept of
sentience, which dictates that one should refrain from harming a being that is capable of
suffering. Nowadays, the definition of sentience is extended to include the capacity to
experience well-being (Appleby and Sandøe 2002). From this capacity it follows that a
being can experience well-being and unwell-being. Sentient beings, therefore, have a
conscious interest in not being harmed and in experiencing well-being.
Some animal species possess, besides sentience, higher complex mental, and behavioral
capacities. Beings with these capacities have mental states such as a will to live and a
concept of life, death, and the future. Regan (1983) describes these animals as subjects-of-
a-life. In his view, all subjects-of-a-life should have our full consideration.
In other theories (Scruton 2000; Carruthers 1992; Kant in Warren 1997), rationality
takes a core position. In this view, only rational beings with self-consciousness and the
capacity to reason are capable of moral judgment. They therefore can be judged morally
and held responsible for their actions. These capacities make them ‘‘moral agents.’’ In this
view, only a moral agent exists as an end in itself and not as a means to an end for others.
When one does not accept that animals are moral agents, it follows that animals themselves
have no importance. Harming an animal then is wrong only because harming animals is an
undesirable character trait, and might abhor other people.
A number of theorists (Warren 1997, and below) reject the idea that one or a number of
intrinsic criteria alone determine the moral importance of animals. They argue that we
should not disregard the value of a personal, historical, or functional/instrumental bond
with people, other animals, and the natural world. The moral importance of an animal is
then defined by both intrinsic and non-intrinsic criteria. In our study, we investigate
whether both intrinsic and non-intrinsic criteria are building blocks of FMAs. Therefore,
we included all these criteria in our model. We will briefly describe the non-intrinsic
criteria below.
Animals in a human community have always been used and valued for their utility, such
as for food production, for their strength as workers, as guardians, or for scientific or
recreational purposes. Their appreciation was therefore related to their usefulness to
people, which was indeed the reason why animals had historically been included in a
human community in the first place. Some theorists, from a more ecological view, value
animals as part of a unit: at the level of the species or ecosystem. Animals in their natural
environment have an important function in the survival of their species and in the func-
tioning of the ecosystem. Some theories emphasize this role of species in the ecosystem,
and consider this a sufficient basis for consideration (Callicot in Warren 1997; Leopold in
Warren 1997; Taylor 1986). Humans should therefore accept that they have responsibilities
towards the natural world and its inhabitants.
Other theories emphasize the strength of the relationship between animals and humans
in a human social community (Anderson 2004; Noddings in Warren 1997). In this social
community, humans and animals have lived and worked together for centuries, often
forming personal, emotional relationships. In this interaction, there exists a ‘‘mutual
promise’’: that a person will care for and protect the animal when the animal is able to
fulfill its assigned task in the community. In a personal relationship between a human and
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an animal, the responsibilities to an animal are a function of this emotional bonding.
Anderson also points out the historical relationship between humans and animals. Over the
centuries, domestic animals have become full members of our human society. In this
position, animals have importance based on their historical role in a social community.
This means that as well as being based on its own intrinsic characteristics, an animal’s
value is also based on its personal and historical value to individuals and the human
community.
According to Hursthouse (1999) virtue ethics as a guide for moral behavior is gaining
ground. This was also described by DeGrazia (1999) in his article on current developments
in animal ethics theory in the twenty-first century. Virtue ethics focuses on the character
traits of a person that are seen to be virtuous, such as charity, honesty, respect, kindness,
and doing good to others. But in what way is virtue guidance for moral behavior, or the
‘‘right’’ action, in a specific situation? Hursthouse suggests that a person’s behavior is the
right action if it is what a virtuous person would characteristically (characteristic for
virtuous character) do in that situation. With respect to animals, being kind to animals is
then not only in the animal’s interest, but is also the morally right action. As a person is not
born with a sense of what is morally right, one could argue that in the treatment of animals,
as in our study, it may be virtuous to strive to become a better (virtuous) person, by letting
kindness and doing good prevail over other non-virtuous motives.
Role of FMAs in Judgment
To learn not only from the theoretical but also from the practical form of convictions, our
second aim is to learn about the role and valuation of FMA convictions in judgment.
Furthermore, we want to know whether a person with a certain FMA profile judges
differently to someone with another FMA profile. If so, then we need to know what this
difference is based on. To this purpose we performed a case-study with four cases, which
was included in the model. The cases described the culling of healthy animals in an
epidemic that differed in one aspect only, namely the argument in favor of culling. These
were veterinary reasons, financial-economic reasons, the protection of human health (eye
infections), and the protection of human life. The arguments against culling reflect the
practical form of the theoretical FMA conviction ‘‘animals have a right to life’’ based on;
the value of an animal’s life, the relevance of a species’ intrinsic capacities (highly
developed) to distinguish between mammals and birds, the financial value of an animal, the
emotional bond between a person and an animal, and virtue (not killing animals is a
virtuous character trait). The arguments can be valued with a number between 0 and 10.
For judgment, the arguments in favor and those against are valued and weighed against
each other. As such, we can learn about the relative value of convictions in a case, between
the cases, between FMAs and as compared to their value in FMAs. Furthermore, we can
determine the turning point in judgment, when a human interest outweighs an FMA
conviction.
Results
Table 1 shows the schematic representation of FMA, with the elements, the dimensions,
and the arguments that are relevant for a particular dimension. For instance, for element 1
(hierarchy), an opinion that humans are superior to animals (dimension 1) can be supported
by the argument ‘‘because animals are not as rational as people’’ (argument 3). Another
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example: for element 3 (to do good) an opinion that we should do good to animals
(dimension 2), that people have a relational bond with (argument 10). Of course all
arguments can apply in one way or the other to all the elements, but for clarity we chose to
include the most relevant ones.
Element 2 serves a slightly different purpose. It tells us whether a shift has taken place
from an animal’s instrumental value to another value. Therefore, there are no arguments in
support of the opposite dimension: ‘‘animals have no value,’’ because this is not relevant
for our purpose.
FMA is determined by the combination of the dimensions of choice and by the
numerical valuation of the arguments. With our model, 54 combinations of dimensions
(3 9 2 9 3 9 3), therefore 54 FMAs are theoretically possible. The arguments can be
valued by a number between 0 and 10, with 0 = not relevant for my opinion and
10 = very relevant for my opinion.
Table 2 gives the four cases about the culling of healthy animals. In each case, arguments
against the culling are weighed against arguments in favor of culling. For judgment the
choice is disagree/partly disagree, partly agree/agree with the culling of healthy animals for
this case. The arguments can be numerically valued with a number between 0 and 10.
Discussion
Reflection on the Theoretical Framework of the Model
We have developed a model that is based on four elements (the pillars), each consisting of
a number of dimensions (conviction on the element) and arguments (the why of a
conviction). We defined FMA by the four elements. We described the stratification of
FMAs by means of the combination of dimensions. We explained the why of convictions
by arguments, and differentiated between the FMAs by comparing the valuation of these
arguments. With this method a maximum of 54 FMAs can be described. We argued that
this sufficiently covers the range of FMAs in Western societies. This we based on our
analysis of the public and philosophical debates on the use and position of animals in
relation to people and on people’s ensuing responsibilities. We described the differences in
judgment between FMAs in a case-study.
The arguments were derived from philosophical animal ethics theories. We aimed to
find if theory can provide the tools to describe (the stratification of) FMAs. The preliminary
studies gave us a fair insight into the moral dilemmas and the moral vocabulary used to
describe these dilemmas. This vocabulary was quite similar to that used in the philo-
sophical academic debates, as both realms ask the same moral questions about the
justification for our treatment of animals. If a shared moral language indeed exists then
theory, FMAs, and public debate have found a way to communicate with each other, from
which the three realms may benefit. The public debate may benefit by using a moral
language to facilitate communication between people, to understand what differences in
opinion are based on. People with different FMAs may benefit because it enables them to
understand the moral basis of each others’ values. Philosophical animal ethics may benefit
by reflecting on empirical studies, to establish in what way theories can be relevant for the
public debate and the description of FMAs. Such reflection can also give an impulse to the
development of new theories to better describe the dynamics of animal issues in society. A
need for new theory was already recognized by Franklin (2006), who expressed the need
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for a good theoretical argument to help solidify a cultural change towards a greater concern
for animals.
In the cases, we focused on the culling and not on the animal welfare problems or the
infringement of autonomy. We think that the former is a more fundamental issue in present
day debates: the value of an animal’s life in itself. It is an example of shifting convictions
about animals. Noordhuizen-Stassen et al. (2003) already found that the killing of animals
is no longer justified merely because it serves a human purpose.
The Concept of FMA
We defend FMA to animals as a dynamic, two-layered concept that rests on four pillars:
hierarchy, value, doing good, and rights. The first layer constitutes the most basic, deeply
felt moral convictions about animals. This we defined as the theoretical form of convic-
tions. In a society, these convictions have been shaped over time by numerous social,
religious, cultural, technological, and other influences and by more knowledge about the
nature of animals (see Marc Bekoff 2007, for his studies about the emotional lives of
animals). In an individual, personal experiences and upbringing further shape one’s FMA
(Fidler 2003; Miura et al. 2002). Derived from the first layer for use as arguments in a
public debate on an animal issue, convictions of the second layer become the practical
form of a conviction. For judgment, the values of these practical convictions are weighed
against other things we value and against convictions of other people. Convictions from the
second layer have either an invariable (the same value as its value for FMA) or a variable
(another value than its value for FMA) value, depending on the time and place, and on the
specific animal issue in a specific context. For instance, the value of an animal’s life can be
invariable when weighed against economic interests, but can be variable when human life
is at risk. The second layer does not hold the same set of convictions all the time. It consists
of convictions that are chosen from the first layer for their relevance in a specific debate. In
a different debate other convictions may migrate to the second layer. Nor does it mean that
the convictions themselves are variable. It means that their value (their weight in a
weighing process) can be variable.
Individuals may hold convictions that have an invariable value. For instance, a person
may think that animals have a right to life in every situation at all times. In a society as a
whole all values are variable, even the value of human life. It would be impossible to
function in a society if all convictions had an invariable value. In such a situation, no
solutions could ever be found in a conflict. However, this does not mean that a deeply felt
conviction cannot exert a strong influence on judgment. Highly valued convictions from
the first layer may ultimately be trumped in the second layer when (a combination of) other
highly valued convictions (moral) or interests (not necessarily moral, such as economic
benefit) are at stake, but they cannot be so easily outweighed by less essential values. In the
debate on the treatment and culling of animals, people drew from FMA convictions from
the first layer, i.e., the intrinsic value of life and the right to life (element 2 and 4) and our
duty to treat animals well (element 3) as arguments in the debate. The debate then con-
cerned the valuation of these convictions in this particular context.
The Dynamics of Animal Ethics Theory, FMAs, Public Debates, and Societal Changes
By analyzing current debates, we can get a fair idea about the nature of public morality.
We all know about generally acceptable behavior in society. For instance, cruelty to
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animals is considered unacceptable in most situations. We propose defining the public (or
common) morality as the collective FMA of a society as a whole. Collective FMA is not
the same as the stratification of FMAs in society. The latter is the total of FMAs of
individuals or groups of people. The former is one dynamic pool of convictions and
intuitions that most of us agree upon (e.g., to treat animals well) and that have a variable
value in a public debate. The values of collective FMA convictions need to be variable, to
bridge differences in FMA convictions of individuals or stakeholders. A public debate can
clarify whether a collective FMA conviction is out of sync with other FMA convictions,
In five steps, we will now discuss the dynamics of animal ethics theories, FMAs, the
public debate and societal change with respect to the culling: 1. Circumstance and context;
2. Case; 3. Public debate; 4. Outcome; and 5. Consequences. We also discuss the input of
theory and FMAs in this process. Step 1: Until now, risk assessment and control policies of
animal diseases were made in the context of livestock production and trade. The culling of
animals was therefore justified on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis rooted in the interests
of the sector (Meijboom et al. in press). Step 2: Unexpectedly, the issue had ceased to be a
problem of the sector alone and had become a case in society as a whole. It had stirred
something in society’s collective morality that needed to be discussed in the public
domain. It had become a case for fundamental criticism on the justification of these policy
decisions. Step 3: In the ensuing public debate, the stakeholders0 convictions were tested
against each other and against the collective FMA. During this process something hap-
pened to these convictions. In a debate, new animal issues confirm and solidify a
conviction, or revalue or cause a shift in convictions. In this case, the issue had solidified
the collective conviction that ‘‘treating animals well’’ can no longer be so easily out-
weighed. Furthermore, the intrinsic value of animals had increased against a devaluation of
their economic value. Thus, as highly valued arguments they had gained the strength to
give the issue its unique focus. These interactions between FMAs give rise to a number of
questions. First, were these changes in FMA convictions case-bound or have they become
part of the collective FMA in their new value or shape? Have they therefore transcended an
individual or group conviction to become a conviction of society? Second, have these
convictions kept their new status upon returning to the first layer: do processes in the public
debate change individual FMAs? A third question is: do FMAs change due to develop-
ments in society or does a particular case of animal use become problematic because our
morality has changed? From our case it seems that both had occurred. The impact of the
culling on such a massive scale, and the visibility of the crisis had been unprecedented. In
that respect it was a new development, which had led to a new moral debate. Also, it had
become a problematic case, because after the adoption of the non-vaccination policy,
morality had developed further, rendering this policy no longer justifiable. Step 4: The
outcome of this debate was a government action to find a new approach to future pre-
vention and control strategies, along with more communication structures between the
parties. As such, policy followed and reflected new morality. A government should be
aware of these dynamics. This is no easy task, considering the plurality in FMAs. To
approach this, a government should look at the second layer to find for each stakeholder,
what convictions are valued in the debate and which of these values are variable. Fur-
thermore, a government should know whether new values have become part of the
collective FMA. Mepham (2000b) recognizes the need for a tool for policy makers to
understand the dynamics of FMAs. They reflect what is new in our convictions. If these
have already migrated to the level of the collective FMA that manifests itself through
public debates, then we need policy to solidify them into our legal system. Step 5: The
consequence of the debate is that morality has evolved to a different level of appreciation
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of animals. It will become part of the moral history of FMA and again will be tested in a
future animal issue. As a result it will develop further. The variability of the value of
convictions allows for these developments.
Some authors (Jonson and Toulmin 1988; Macnaghten 2001, 2004; Mepham 2000b;
Posner 2004) state that people’s moral convictions are not (only) based on theories of duty
and rights, but (also) on moral intuitions and personal experience, in this case encounters
with animals. It is likely that an interaction is at play here. Jonson and Toulmin (1988)
defend that moral theories manifest themselves at different levels: at the purely intellectual
academic level on the one extreme to the practical level on the other. If the latter is true,
then animal ethics theories are one of the many inputs that shape theoretical convictions.
They may be interpreted to fit the theoretical context of a person’s or collective FMA. For
example, a theory may propose only one criterion for having rights. In an interpretation this
criterion may be necessary but not sufficient and other criteria are taken into consideration
as well (the multi-criteria account proposed by Warren 1997). At the second layer, a theory
becomes a moral argument. This further explains the usefulness of theory to describe FMA
and its dynamics, because it is actually a part of FMA.
Animal ethicists who are interested in the practicability and dynamics of theory and
FMAs need to know how and why a theory becomes a moral argument, and whether it has
become part of the collective FMA. In this way they can learn about the evolution of
morality, and develop new theory in line with societal changes. It is essential to be aware
of these changes. Practical moral theory that does not stay tuned to social realities is at risk
of isolating itself from the collective morality completely and is then no longer practical or
relevant.
Applicability of the Model
The validity of the model was tested in a number of empirical surveys. By statistical
analysis, we were able to describe FMAs, their stratification, and their roles in judgment.
With the numerical valuation of the arguments we were able to identify their importance
for an FMA conviction and distinguish between the moral bases of different FMAs.
Furthermore, we could identify their relative valuation in judgment. We found that the
value of an animal’s life conviction (in combination with other arguments) was indeed a
core argument against the culling of animals. This confirms Anthony’s (2004) analysis of
the strength of this conviction in the debate. Therefore, we defend the model’s usefulness
for our empirical research purposes.
In a next qualitative step the model should be tested in a debate about future animal
disease control strategies. Representatives of all relevant stakeholders should be included
to do justice to the diversities in FMAs. The aim is to establish whether the model can help
structure the boundaries of the debate, stretching from what is morally required (the bottom
line) to what is morally acceptable (common ground), using the three values ‘‘value of
life’’, ‘‘duty to treat animals well’’, and ‘‘autonomy’’ from the different perspectives of the
participants. With these moral tools in hand, a number of potential prevention and control
strategies can be selected and discussed for their implications for those involved, including
the animals. To this purpose the Ethical Matrix, developed by Ben Mepham, is a useful
tool to visualize ethical decision-making and the implications of policy for the actors
(Mepham 2000a).
The model can be used to study differences between groups (animal practices, gender,
cultures, religions, regional differences, etc.). The structure of the model is adaptable to
accommodate other studies. Changes can be made at all levels: the elements, the
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dimensions, and the arguments, and with respect to the cases. For example, for our study
we chose the right to life. This can be replaced by another right, such as the right to be free
from suffering. This gives information about the strength of people’s obligation for doing
good to animals. Although anti-cruelty laws guarantee certain protection against suffering,
it does not follow that animal use is prohibited per se. A right to be free from suffering,
especially when it is a legal right, is a stronger claim on people and could entail more
fundamental changes in our use of animals.
For our study element 2 was structured to study the shift in the valuation (here:
appreciation) of animals. In another form, one can learn about the reasons why someone
does or does not value animals. This would require a change in dimensions to: all animals
have value, because…, some animals have value, namely…, and: animals have no value,
because…. Adjustments at the argument level are required to support these dimensions.
At the argument level, alterations are possible, provided that they still reflect the moral
basis of an opinion. Then alterations can be useful for comparative religion or philosophy
of life studies, or between religion-based and non-religion based moral convictions. For
instance, one may find that humans are superior to animals because animals are not
rational, or because animals lack an immortal soul.
As there are numerous animal issues and because new animal uses pose new moral
questions, case studies remain necessary to understand the dynamics of convictions. With
new case studies, it is possible to study which convictions have migrated to the second
layer and what their value is in relation to other values in other contexts.
One practical application is the use of the model for educational purposes. In interna-
tional exchange programs, universities bring together students from a diversity of cultures
and backgrounds with different attitudes to animals. This difference becomes relevant in
the field of animal sciences and biomedical research that rest on the use of animals. We
successfully applied the model as a discussion tool to address the ethical acceptability of
animal use for animal experimentation, and the possible culturally-based differences in
opinion.
Conclusion
Public debates reveal that opposing moral convictions can be the cause of conflict over an
animal issue. In this paper we present and defend a model to describe the stratification of
fundamental moral attitudes (FMAs) to animals in society. The model identifies the moral
basis of these convictions about the position, value, care and protection, and rights of
animals. We used animal ethics theories as a moral language to describe FMAs. Fur-
thermore, with the model the role of FMAs in judgment on an animal issue can be clarified.
We argue that FMAs are dynamic and diverse and that they change over time. The model
can serve to monitor these dynamics of FMAs in the public debate over time. Moreover, it
takes the public debate a step further because it helps to answer the why of opposing
opinions. Finally, the model provides a means of communication between the academic
field of animal ethics, people’s FMAs, and public debate.
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